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Contempt of Congress: A Reply to the Critics of an
Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis
Lawrence C. Marshall*

In the law school tradition of "suspending belief," Professor Eskridge has created a hypothetical in which I, in my first case as Chief
Justice of the United States, 1 must decide whether to adhere to various
antiquated and seemingly erroneous precedents interpreting the Mann
Act. 2 Eskridge assumes that I will feel compelled to adhere to these
decisions, for to do otherwise, he contends, would force me to abandon the proposal for an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis that I
advanced recently in this Law Review. 3 Eskridge then offers a variety
of critiques of my thesis, coming from perspectives as diverse as the
critical legal studies and law-and-economics movements. The hypothetical that Eskridge has created is not a particularly difficult one for
me to grapple with, as the absolute rule of statutory stare decisis is not
as wooden as Eskridge might think. I shall briefly deal with his Mann
Act hypothetical in Part I of this reply. In the remaining three Parts,
I respond to the each of the three concurrences Eskridge has drafted.
I.

THE

MANN ACT

As enacted in 1910, the Mann Act prohibited the interstate transportation of "any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or
debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose. " 4 The last six words of
this clause have been the subject of a number of Supreme Court decisions. Shortly after the statute was enacted, for example, the Court
held in Caminetti v. United States 5 that a man violated the "immoral
purposes" clause of the Mann Act when he transported a woman
across state lines so that she could become his mistress and concubine.
* Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1979, Beth Hatalmud
College; J.D. 1985, Northwestern University. - Ed. Many thanks to Patricia E. Sindel for her
research assistance.
1. It is worth noting that with my supposed appointment the name Marshall becomes the
only name shared by three justices. Currently it is tied with Chase, Harlan, Jackson, Johnson,
Lamar, Rutledge, and White at two apiece.
2. Eskridge, The Case of The Amorous Defendant: Criticizing Absolute Stare Decisisfor Statutory Cases, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2450 (1990).
3. Marshall, ''Let Congress Do It'~· The Case for an Absolute Rule ofStatutory Stare Decisis,
88 MICH. L. REv. 177 (1989).
4. White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (emphasis added).
5. 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
2467

2468

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 88:2467

The Court rejected the argument that the statute was restricted to the
transport of women for the purpose of furnishing them as prostitutes. 6
Three decades later the Court reaffirmed this holding in Cleveland v.
United St~tes, 7 in which it upheld the conviction of a man who, consistent with his religious beliefs, had engaged in polygamy, and had
transported a woman across state lines for this purpose. Although
four justices expressed the view that Caminetti had been wrongly decided, 8 the Court adhered to the holding in Caminetti "which has been
in force for almost thirty years, that the Act, while primarily aimed at
the use of interstate commerce for the purposes of commercialized sex,
is not restricted to that end." 9
If the question posed by Eskridge's hypothetical required a decision on whether petitioner violated the Mann Act as enacted in 1910
and as interpreted by Caminetti and Cleveland, it is not clear to me
what the proper answer would be. Surely, adherence to a strong rule
of stare decisis would preclude a holding that the Mann Act applies to
commercialized sex alone, even if that may appear to be a better reading of the statute as an original matter. But even a strong adherent of
statutory stare decisis need not conclude that the decisions in Caminetti and Cleveland froze the definition of "immoral purpose" for all
time. Neither Caminetti nor Cleveland suggested that what constitutes an immoral purpose is a static determination that is governed by
the intent of the Congress that enacted the Mann Act in 1910. Assuming that the Mann Act requires a court to determine whether a
purpose is immoral under contemporary morality, the precedents of
Caminetti and Cleveland are not very informative. 10 There is a critical
6. Justice Day explained that while the immorality of the purpose
would be more culpable in morals and attributed to baser motives if accompanied with the
expectation of pecuniary gain, such considerations do not prevent the lesser offense against
morals of furnishing transportation in order that a woman may be debauched, or become a
mistress or a concubine from being the execution of purposes within the meaning of this law.
To say the contrary would shock the common understanding of what constitutes an im·
moral purpose when those terms are applied, as here, to sexual relations.
242 U.S. at 486.
7. 329 U.S. 14 (1946). For a detailed discussion of the Mann Act and the Caminetli-C/eve/and line of cases, see E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 24-58 (1949).
8. 329 U.S. at 20 (Black, J., with whom Jackson, J., joined, dissenting); 329 U.S. at 21 (Rutledge, J., concurring); 329 U.S. at 24 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
9. 329 U.S. at 18.
10. As Judge Posner has written:
This country's sexual mores have changed in the last thirty years and it may be questioned
whether today a purpose to engage in adultery or fornication, when these acts are commit·
ted without aggravating circumstances, such as force, misrepresentation, or taking advan·
tage of a minor, is immoral within the meaning of the Mann Act (assuming it was not thi:
intention of the framers of the Act to freeze the meaning of "immoral" as of 1910, when the
Act was passed).
United States v. Wolf, 787 F.2d 1094, 1101 (7th Cir. 1986).

August 1990]

Correspondence

2469

difference between the precedential import of a legal standard articulated by a court and the specific application of the standard to the set
of facts before the court. An absolute rule of statutory stare decisis
does not claim to govern applications of law to changing factual patterns, or, in this case, to determine views of contemporary morality
from cases of previous generations.11
Congress, however, has not allowed the holdings in Caminetti and
Cleveland to stand unaltered. Just as might be predicted with regard
to matters on which the Court has declined to overrule outdated
precedents, Congress has confronted and addressed the issue. In 1986,
Congress deleted the "immoral purpose" clause of the Mann Act, inserting in its place a prohibition of transporting a person for "sexual
activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense. "12 Frankly Amorous very probably has violated the Mann Act
as it is now written, as a Virginia statute prohibits sexual intercourse
between unmarried persons.13
One might have thought that the statutory interpretation inquiry
would end with the determination that Amorous' conduct fell within
the plain language of the statute, and that Amorous' only hope of
overturning his conviction would rest with his constitutional challenge
to the statute. But Eskridge has created a fictitious 1993 Supreme
Court decision, Squalid v. United States, in which the Supreme Court
held that not all sexual conduct that violates state law can serve as a
predicate to a Mann Act violatfon. Rather, the activity must be immoral, in the way that the term was used in the original Mann Act,
and in the way that the Court interpreted ii in Caminetti and Cleve11. I should stress here that the courts' authority to "update" the application of the "immoral purposes" clause is derived from the statutory formulation itself, and not from any broad
judicial power to reverse or ignore specific value choices that Congress has made which may have
since become obsolete. For example, the "prostitution" clause of the Mann Act is not subject to
the same flexible application that the "immoral purposes" clause is, for it embodies a declaration
of Congress' intent to prohibit a specific type of conduct without regard to changing moral views.
Whether this prohibition ought to be struck down as an unconstitutional invasion of sexual autonomy is a different question.
12. Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-628, § 5, 100 Stat.
3510, 3511 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1988)).
13. VA. CooE ANN. § 18.2-344 (1988). Perhaps an argument can be made that notwithstanding this Virginia statute petitioner cannot "be charged with a criminal offense" under Virginia law, either because the Constitution prohibits Virginia from prosecuting him for this
consensual sexual conduct, see Doe v. Duling, 603 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Va. 1985), vacated for lack
ofstanding, 782 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir. 1986), or because Virginia's cohabitation statute has fallen
into desuetude. Cf. Doe v. Duling, 782 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th Cir. 1986) (observing that Virginia's
"last recorded conviction for private, consensual cohabitation occurred in 1883"); Fort v. Fort,
12 Mass. App. Ct. 411, 417, 425 N.E.2d 754, 758 (1981) ("It seems beyond dispute that the
statutes defining or punishing the crimes of fornication, adultery, and lewd and lascivious cohabitation have fallen into a very comprehensive desuetude."). I will assume for purposes of argument that neither of these conditions apply.
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land I personally find Squalid to be an implausible and indeed
"clearly wrong" precedent; considering the plain language and legislative history of the 1986 amendment. 14 But a precedent it is, and under
the doctrine of absolute statutory stare decisis that I have espoused I
would be compelled to adhere to it.
Based on the "immoral purpose" limitation adopted by Squalid I
would conclude that Amorous did not violate the Mann Act. In view
of contemporary sexual mores, I do not believe that unmarried cohabitation between lovers can be classified as immoral in the sense the
Mann Act appears to have used that term. 15 The Caminetti Court
may well have reached a different conclusion had this case arisen in its
time; but it is that Court's articulation of the proper legal standard not its application of the standard to any specific set of facts - that
creates the precedent that a court should follow.
My approach to statutory construction appears to be a bit more
"dynamic" than Eskridge anticipated, 16 and it no doubt opens me up
to attack as wea.Seling out of the dictates of my rule by "distinguishing" indistinguishables. But nothing in my proposal removes the need
for justices to define the proper scope of a precedent. And it seems
clear to me that recognizing changed sexual mores is not at all inconsistent with the holdings of Cleveland or Caminetti.
The bulk of Eskridge's criticism does not, however, focus on the
specific statutes involved here. Rather he offers a variety of theoretical
and practical attacks on the absolute rule of statutory stare decisis that
I have proposed. Because the nature of their attacks are so varied, I
respond to each of the three opinions separately below.

II.

REsPONSE TO POSNERBROOK ET AL.

Justice Posnerbrook, joined by Justices Samuelson and Schwartz,
begins his attack on my proposal by contending that although its goals
are salutary, there is no empirical basis for assuming that it will actually stimulate more congressional activity. I readily acknowledge the
lack of empirical data to support my thesis. Because the absolute rule
14. The goal of the amendment was to eliminate the need for an assessment of immorality.
See H.R. REP. No. 910, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMJN,
NEWS 5952, 5958. It is quite telling that Eskridge has had to resort to his imagination in order
to find a precedent as obviously wrong as Squalid. See Marshall, supra note 3, at 231-35 (ques·
tioning the assumption that there are many "clearly wrong precedents" at Supreme Court level),
15. See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 683, 557 P.2d 106, 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 831
(1976) (recognizing changes in moral and social status of cohabitation). See generally Fineman,
Law and Changing Patterns of Behavior: Sanctions on Non-marital Cohabitation, 1981 Wis. L.
REV. 275; Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility of a Shared
Moral Life, 15 GEO. L.J. 1829 (1987).
16. See Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987).
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of statutory stare decisis has never been implemented on the federal
level, there is simply no probative evidence of how Congress actually
reacts to such a system. True, some states seem to adhere to a more
absolute form of stare decisis than the federal courts do, but the dramatic differences between the state and federal systems (and the differences between various state systems themselves) foreclose any
meaningful comparisons: For what it may be worth though, the English system may offer some empirical support for my proposal. Until
1966 the House of Lords refused to overrule precedents, and, even
since then, it has been extremely reticent to overrule statutory precedents.17 Parliament, in turn, has been quite active in reviewing and
overturning statutory precedents. 18 I hesitate to rely on this evidence,
however, because I recognize the vast differences between our systems
of government and legal cultures.
Beyond demanding empirical data, Posnerbrook disputes part of
the theoretical framework I have relied upon in predicting the effects
of an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis. Specifically, he questions
my suggestion that in a world without a strong or absolute rule of
statutory stare decisis Congress would have the opportunity to pass
the buck to the courts by telling constituents t!1at the Court may overrule itself and that congressional action. therefore is not essential. 19
Posnerbrook asserts that "legislators cannot credibly pass the buck
under current Supreme Court practice" because "[i]t takes decades for
the Court to overrule virtually any statutory ... preced~nt." 20
To respond to this important point, I must review briefly what I
attempted to do in my earlier article. My primary goai there was to
explore whether the Court's articulated (and generally followed) adherence to a heightened form of statutory stare decisis is justifiable.
After reviewing and -rejecting a variety of justifications that have been
offered in support of the Court's current practice, I concluded that the
only reasonable defense of the Court's heightened rule of statutory
17. See A. PATERSON, THE LAW LoRDS 156 (1982); L. BLOM-COOPER {Ir. G. DREWRY,
FINAL APPEAL: A STUDY OF THE HOUSE OF LoRDS IN ITS JUDICIAL CAPACITY 361 (1972);
Maher, Statutory Interpretation and Overruling in the House of Lords, 1981 STATUTE L. REv.
85.
18. Blom-Cooper and Drewry explain that "[t]here is a mutual understanding that courts
and Parliament must harmonize and dovetail their respective law-making functions .... [Parliament] has on the whole responded to the invitation from the House of Lords to sponsor remedial
legislation reversing court decisions." L. BLOM-COOPER & G. DREWRY, supra note 17, at 365;
see also R. STEVENS, LAW AND PoLmcs: THE HOUSE OF LORDS AS A JUDICIAL BODY, 18001976, at 615 (1978).
19. This argument to constituents may often be accompanied with a warning that if Congress
were to consider the matter it would likely reconsider other aspects of the legislative scheme, and
that the constituents might well lose far more than they gain.
20. Eskridge, supra note 2, at 2454.
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stare decisis is a normative theory that puts the job of revisiting statutory decisions in Congress' hands. J then suggested that the goals of
this normative approach would be served more faithfully if the Court
were to adopt an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis. 21
It does not surprise me, then, to hear that legislators cannot typically pass the buck under the Court's current approach, which, after
all, is a relatively heightened form of stare decisis. Indeed, this realization about Congress' current inability to convince constituents to wait
for the Court to reverse itself supports my hypothesis that as the prospects for judicial reversal of a decision become more remote (both with
regard to time and probability), the pressure on Congress to respond
increases.
The only question Posnerbrook can raise therefore is whether the
marginal utility of invoking an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis
outweighs its costs. Because one cannot quantify the precise difference
an absolute rule - as opposed to the current heightened rule - would
have on Congress' reactions to judicial decisions, the focus should tum
to the costs side of the equation. If the costs of the absolute rule are
nonexistent or minimal, then a theoretically plausible marginal increase in congressional reaction ought to be welcomed. On the other
hand, if the costs are significant, then incurring them for the sake of an
unproved theoretical hypothesis would probably be a mistake.
It is with respect to defining what constitutes a "cost" of my proposal that Posnerbrook and I diverge most dramatically. Sounding
surprisingly like William Eskridge, 22 Posnerbrook argues that the
Court's role qua statutory interpreter includes the job of altering prior
interpretations of congressional intent in order to adjust a statute's
practical fit with statutory, common law, and constitutional developments.23 As my discussion of the Mann Act's "immoral purpose"
clause demonstrates, I agree that some statutes call on the courts to
apply a statutory phrase in light of modem developments (including
statutory and common law developments). In such cases, a later court
does not reverse a previous court's interpretation of a statute when it
reaches a conclusion different from its predecessor's. But in the more
typical case, it is Congress' job - not the Court's - to decide whether
a statute ought to be updated. Far from counting as a cost of the
absolute rule, diverting courts from this legislative task is one of the
primary goals of the thesis I have advanced.
21. Marshall, supra note 3, at 215.
22. Cf. Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1988); Eskridge, supra
note 16, at 1479.
23. Eskridge, supra note 2, at 2456-57.
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Of course, Posnerbrook is correct in asserting that judicial refusal
to revisit interpretation of statutes may mean that courts will have to
decide more cases on constitutional grounds. Posnerbrook writes that
the "Court often avoids difficult constitutional issues by reinterpreting
statutes," but that under the absolute rule of stare decisis the Court
would be forced to confront these questions, which "might tempt [it]
toward constitutional activism, which is of course countermajoritarian. "24 I am not at all convinced, though, that the reinterpretation of statutes to avoid possible constitutional impediments is
any less countermajoritarian than judicial review itself. Indeed, reinterpretation may be even more intrusive of the legislature's proper authority, for, as Judge Richard Posner has written, it expands the scope
of the Constitution's restrictions by creating "a judge-made 'penumbra' that has much the same prohibitory effect as the ... Constitution
itself." 25 Moreover, when a court strikes down a statute on constitutional grounds it typically exercises only the negative power of invalidating an enactment.26 It is then up to the legislat~e to decide
whether to enact a new statute, and if so, what kind of statute to enact.
By contrast, when a court construes a statute to avoid constitutional
doubts it engages in the activist task of actually rewriting the statutory
provision to its liking.
There is a flip side of these arguments as well. A court that construes a statute to avoid constitutional questions arguably engages in a
form of colloquy with Congress, inviting Congress to overturn the
court's interpretation if Congress is not satisfied with it. This conversation with Congress might be considered somewhat less interventionist than outright judicial invalidation. But it is only less
interventionist as compared with judicial invalidation; who knows in
how many cases the court might ultimately uphold the statute if it
were forced to pass upon it as a matter of pure constitutionality.
Whatever conclusion one reaches on the merits of the avoidance
doctrine it seems clear that it is not of such obvious value to cast any
broad doctrine of stare decisis into question. In any event, to the extent one is particularly whetted to the values served· by the avoidance
doctrine, it would be quite simple to carve a narrow exception to the
generally applicable stare decisis rule in order to accommodate it.
24. Id. at 2457.
25. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL CoURTS: CRisiS AND REFORM 285 (1985). I discuss the
avoidance doctrine more fully in Marshall, Divesting the Courts: Breaking the Judicial Monopoly
on Constitutional Interpretation, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. (forthcoming 1990).
26. In some cases it might find the unconstitutional segment of the statute severable, in
which case it would leave the remainder of the statute in force. See, e.g., Alaska Airline, Inc. v.
Brock, 480 U.S. 678 (1987).
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REsPONSE TO F'ISSERMAN ET AL.

Justices Fisserman, Michaelminow, and Guidobresi define the role
of the courts in two words: do justice. It is hard to argue with such a
noble pursuit. The arguments only start once it is realized that these
individuals' conception of justice is quite often likely to be fundamentally different from the conception many other individuals, perhaps
even most Americans, share. When this happens, whose conception
should govern? Our system of government has an answer to these
sorts of problems: we call it constitutional democracy. Under this
system the electorally accountable branches are entitled to enact laws
that, subject to constitutional limitations, will be applied by the executive and judicial branches. It is hard to believe that Fisserman contests this model, or really contends that "we fought the Revolution" in
order to have unelected and unaccountable judges routinely impose
their views of 'justice" in place of legislative enactments. The battle
cry of the revolution was against "taxation without representation" a label that applies with substantial force to the view of statutory interpretation that Fisserman posits for the courts.
I am not so naive as to pretend that our democracy works per. fectly, or that Congress' work product always, or even frequently, reflects the views and values of a majority of citizens. But the cure to
these flaws in our representational system is not to divert the decisionmaking authority to an even less accountable body. Fisserman rightly
proclaims that the "courts owe their complete fealty to 'We The People,' " 27 but she never explains how this principle translates into
judges subverting legislative policy choices based on the judges' idiosyncratic, aconstitutional conceptions of 'justice."
Fisserman further contends that even if the courts properly are
viewed as agents of the legislature when it comes to statutory interpretation, agents may make decisions. As "relational agents," she argues,
judges are expected to exercise significant discretion in shaping statutory developments, even "bending the old directives beyond recognition"28 when that seems appropriate. The difference between
Fisserman and me on this point may be one of degree. Although I
agree that agents are typically left with the discretion to make routine
decisions, I also believe that principals typically retain the authority to
make the important policy-oriented decisions that come up from time
to time. Decisions to reverse earlier interpretations of statutes seem to
fall into this latter category. As has been suggested, it is changes in
27. Eskridge, supra note 2, at 2459.
28. Id. at 2460.

August 1990]

Correspondence

2475

the social and legal climate that often provide the impetus for the call
to overrule a statutory precedent.29 In many cases, the dissatisfaction
is not so much with the court's earlier interpretation of statutory ambiguity, as it is dissatisfaction with the statute itself. To use Fisserman's words again, the Court is being asked to "[bend] the old
directives beyond recognition." 30 It seems quite reasonable to assume
that in most agencies the principal will retain the sole authority to
make these kinds of direction-shifting decisions.
Even if my characterization of the typical agency relationship is
accurate however, Fisserman asserts that it is internally inconsistent
for me to suggest that the Court - as opposed to Congress - ought
to be the one to initiate the absolute rule of statutory stare decisis.
This is a difficult point for me, for although I would certainly prefer
that Congress be the body to promulgate this type of rule, I recognize
that this is not about to happen. Congress is no doubt delighted to
enjoy the option of leaving certain divisive issues - even fundamental
ones - to the courts. If Congress were the ultimate principal in this
agency relationship then Congress' wishes on this point would be decisive. But, as Fisserman proclaims, the People are the ultimate principals here. If the Court becomes convinced that its role in revisiting
statutory decisions is an inherently legislative one, then the constitutional structure of separation of powers should be enough to justify the
Court's invocation of the rule without congressional directive. 31

IV. REsPONSE TO MAcFJNLEY ET AL.
Justices MacFinley and Kennedy raise a variety of objections to
the absolute rule of statutory stare decisis, suggesting that it is trivial
as a practical matter and "[e]ven as an intellectual exercise ... [it] goes
nowhere." 32 Echoing one of the themes touched on by Justice Posnerbrook, MacFinley first argues that the small number of judicial overrulings of statutory decisions makes the question of an absolute rule
trivial. The validity of this point depends on one's baseline however.
If it is assumed that the current heightened rule is justifiable and ought
to be preserved, then the absolute rule may not make a dramatic difference in the way courts and Congress look at statutory reinterpretation.
If this baseline is accepted as the appropriate one, then my article's
29. Id. at 2456-57.
30. Id. at 2460.
31. For those who remain unconvinced by this quasi-constitutional point, I am more than
willing to have my proposal considered a petition to Congress as opposed to a brief to the Court.
The functional merits of the approach do not depend on who initiates its adoption.
32. Eskridge, supra note 2, at 2461.
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primary mission has been accomplished. Providing a coherent theoretical justification for the current approach to statutory precedents
was the meat of my article. The suggestion that the rule be made absolute was, so to speak, gravy.
On the other hand, if MacFinley intends to suggest that no doctrine of stare decisis ever really matters to judges' decisions, I cannot
agree. Notwithstanding the flexibility inherent in interpreting and applying precedents, rules of stare decisis often create significant constraints on the range of acceptable decisions. For example, I continue
to maintain that the Court in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union 33
could not have "pretended to distinguish away" Runyon v. McCrary 34
and "announce a new rule limiting 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to private acts of
discrimination without explicitly overruling Runyon. " 35 MacFinley
asserts that I am "quite wrong" on this point, and that the Court's
decision in Patterson actually demonstrates just how flexible precedent
can be, because the five Justices in the majority seemed able to pass the
"red-faced" test with impunity. 36 But nothing the majority did in Patterson concerning Runyon's interpretation of section 1981 should have
caused the Justices' faces to flush. Runyon did not decide whether onthe-job harassment constitutes discrimination in the "making and enforcement" of contracts as forbidden by section 1981. The relevant
part of Runyon was its holding that section 1981 applied to private
action as well as state action, a conclusion the Court unanimously reaffirmed in Patterson, notwithstanding the Court's declaration that
"[s]ome Members of this Court believe that Runyon was decided incorrectly."37 As Justice Kennedy wrote: "Our conclusion that we
should adhere to our decision in Runyon that§ 1981 applies to private
conduct is not enough to decide this case. We must decide also
whether the conduct of which petitioner complains falls within one of
the enumerated rights protected by§ 1981."38 One can easily disagree
with Patterson's narrow definition of making and enforcing contracts,
but there is no basis for accusing the Court of infidelity to precedent,
.or using Patterson to demonstrate the pliability of precedent.
Aside from her claim that my proposal is trivial and futile,
MacFinley argues that it is internally incoherent. To begin with, she
claims that to adopt my proposal the Court would be required to over33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

109 s. Ct. 2363 (1989).
427 U.S. 160 (1976).
Marshall, supra note 3, at 218.
See Eskridge, supra note 2, at 2463 n.34.
109 S. Ct. at 2370.
109 S. Ct. at 2372.
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rule scores of previous cases in which it declared that statutory precedents may be overruled under some vaguely defined circumstances.
The easiest way for me to avoid this paradox is, of course, to call for
Congress to enact a law imposing an absolute rule of statutory stare
decisis on the Court. 39 I recognize that Congress is not likely to enact
any such law anytime soon, however,40 and I am intent therefore on
defending my proposal as one directed to the Court.
Two factors relieve some of the paradox of overruling earlier cases
in order to adopt a rule against overruling cases: first, the constitutional underpinnings of the proposal41 make this something more than
a pure matter of statutory (or even common law) construction; second,
the lack of any clear binding precedent on how to deal with precedents
makes the adoption of my proposal less than a clear overruling.42 As
MacFinley demonstrates, however, neither of these answers provides a
wholly coherent solution to the paradox my proposal has created.43
To the extent that they are unsatisfying, the solution to this conundrum may rest in the notion of prospectivity. In its decision to adopt
an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis the Court could, consistent
with the old rule which allows for the repudiation of some old precedents, prospectively repudiate the old rule and ~ounce that this is
the last nonconstitutional precedent it would overrule. This solution
might seem a bit artificial, and I offer it only for those who are unsatisfied with the previously advanced justifications.
Another argument MacFinley raises is that my proposal does not
go far enough on its own terms. Logically, she claims, the rule against
overruling precedents ought not be limited to the Supreme Court's
statutory interpretation decisions, but should be extended to matters
upon which the lower courts have reached a clear cpnsensus. I do not
_believe, however, that the doctrine need be, or should be, extended this
far. To begin with, MacFinley has not explained how one would go
about identifying a "consensus" oflower court decisions, and this difficulty constitutes a significant distinction between a decision of the
Supreme Court and a consensus among .lower courts. Moreover, extending the absolute rule of stare decisis to lower court decisions
would put extreme pressure on the Supreme Court to alter its certiorari practice. In many cases the Court would have to grant review in
39. Perhaps Congress could include this provision within a Statutory Construction Act,
which would set forth some general rules of statutory construction for courts to follow.
40. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
41. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
42. See Marshall, supra note 3, at 220 n.199.
43. See Eskridge, supra note 2, at 2462-63.
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order to review an issue before a consensus of lower court decisions
develops, even if the case presenting the issue is not a good candidate
for review or other more pressing issues need to be decided by the
Court. A proposal that makes Supreme Court decisions binding interpretations (as I have suggested) is in no way equivalent to one that
would foreclose the Supreme Court from ever addressing some issues
of statutory interpretation (as would happen under MacFinley's modification of my prqposal). Although an argument can be made for extending the absolute rule to lower court decisions, there is surely
nothing incoherent about a proposal that recognizes the distinctions
between the Supreme Court's and lower courts' decisions.
Nor is it at all incoherent to limit the proposal to statutory decisions, and not to advocate an absolute rule of stare decisis with respect
to constitutional decisions as well. The typical role of the courts in
interpreting the Constitution is substantially different from their normal role in statutory interpretation. The Constitution is replete with
clauses that call on the courts to apply norms to ever changing political and social circumstances. Consistent with the notion of the Constitution as a living document, definitions and applications of terms
like "due process," "cruel and unusual punishment," and "unreasonable search and seizure" evolve over time. The specter of judges inserting content into these phrases is not an unfortunate or inevitable
by-product of the framers' poor drafting or lack of foresight; it is a
critical part of the process of breathing life into a document originated
by those long dead. 44 Of course, the amendment process as set forth
in article V is available as a mechanism of change, but it surely is not
the design of the Constitution to require the support of a modem
supermajority before the judiciary may declare a prior constitutional
decision no longer valid. 45 To require such supermajority support
for implementation of a constitutional provision flouts the
countermajoritarian nature of the Constitution itself.
The courts' role in statutory interpretation is quite different. Here,
there is a living Congress capable of making new policy choices that
need to be made. Nothing about our political system makes resort to
Congress the same kind of exceptional and dangerous enterprise that
44. See Marshall, supra note 3, at 206.
45. Although I do not advocate an absolute rule of stare decisis in constitutional cases, I do
believe that the Court has become far too inclined to consider overruling its constitutional deci·
sions. With respect to the flag-burning issue, for example, if a supermajority of the United States
wishes to amend the Constitution to overrule Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989), and
United States v. Eichman, 58 U.S.L.W. 4744 (1990), they should not have to contend with the
argument that the appointment of Justice Brennan's successor will, no doubt, enable the Court to
reverse itself anyway.
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resort to a constitutional amendment is. Government by the
electorally accountable branch is the norm of our constitutional system - a process that ought to be encouraged, not feared and avoided.
It is clear, though, that MacFinley and Kennedy are not enamoi:ed
of the political branches. They point out that minorities and wo~en
are severely underrepresented in Congress and suggest that only wellto-do, white, and I suppose heterosexual, males are likely to see Congress as occupying the top of .the democracy continuum. They accuse
me of ignoring. these dysfunctions in our political systeIQ., and suggest
that I probably think that "things are significantly 'better' now" than
they were in 1910, "for women and blacks are at least able to vote." 46
MacFinley and Kennedy are right: I do think things are much better
now, although I also believe that there still is a long road ahead to
travel. But I don't see how we improve our democracy by shifting
policy choices away from the legislature and toward the courts. No
matter how unrepresentative Congress may be, it will never come
close to the unrepresentative status of federal judges, who, by the way,
are not much more diverse than the body that confirms them. 47
CONCLUSION

The dominant theme that seems to run through· the Professor Eskridge's objections to my proposal to "Let Congress Do It" is his
rather powerful contempt of Congress. Based on his distaste for congressional decisionmaking, Eskridge is pleased to have the courts, in
which he seems to have such unyielding trust, continue to make important policy choices in the course of their interpretations of statutes.
I share many of Eskridge's concerns about the dysfunctions of our
political system. Reform clearly is needed. But that reform should
take the form of reflecting upon how we elect our representatives and
how we monitor their work, not throwing up our hands and opting for
government by the judiciary.

46. Eskridge, supra note 2, at 2464.
47. If recent legislative enactments reversing Supreme Court decisions are any indicator,
Congress may, in fact, be far more protective than the courts of some of the groups McFinley has
identified. See, e.g., Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28
(responding to Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984)); Civil Rights Act of 1990, S2140,
lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (bill to reverse a number of "conservative" Supreme Court decisions
issued in the October 1988 Term).

